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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW-DISCRIMINATION:
AN EEOC REGULATION ALLOWING EMPLOYERS
TO ASSERT THAT AN EMPLOYEE MAY NOT POSE A
DANGER TO HIMSELF FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002)
I. FACTS
Mario Echazabal worked for an independent contractor, Irwin Indus-
tries, as a plant helper in a Chevron refinery in El Segundo, California.'
With the exception of a three-year break from 1976 through 1978,
Echazabal had been employed as a plant helper with various independent
contractors at the Chevron refinery from 1972 until 1996.2 Twice during
the course of Echazabal's employment, he applied for positions directly
with Chevron. 3 Each time Echazabal applied for a position at Chevron's
coker unit,4 and was hired contingent upon passing the company's physical
exam.5 Following both instances, he was not hired because of his disability,
a chronic hepatitis condition. 6
Echazabal first attempted to gain direct employment with Chevron in
1992 as a plant helper in the coker unit.7 As part of its screening process,
Chevron required all potential employees to undergo physical exams before
it would offer permanent placement.8 Passing the physical exam was
1. Brief for Respondent at 1, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (No.
00-1406).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1-2.
4. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (No.
00-1406). A refinery coker unit processes residium oilin order to extract useful byproducts from
the raw material. Id.
5. Respondent's Brief at 1, Echazabal (No. 00-1406).
6. Id. at 2. In its brief, Chevron conceded that it denied Echazabal's request for permanent
employment on the basis of his disability, hepatitis C. Petitioner's Brief at 11, Echazabal (No. 00-
1406). Echazabal did not assert that Chevron or Irwin Industries could have made a reasonable
accommodation. Id. at 3 n. 1.
7. Respondent's Brief at 1, Echazabal (No. 00-1406). Chevron claimed that Echazabal's de-
teriorated liver condition put him at additional risk for catastrophic exposure to toxins. Petition-
er's Brief at 11, Echazabal (No. 00-1406). Echazabal contradicted Chevron's assertion that
working in the plant posed a danger to his health. Respondent's Reply Brief at 1, Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (No. 00-1406).
8. Petitioner's Brief at 8-9, Echazabal (No. 00-1406).
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incorporated into Chevron's written qualifications for the position. 9 After
Echazabal submitted his application and underwent the review process,
Chevron offered to employ him.10 However, the offer was contingent on
his ability to pass a physical exam administered by a Chevron physician. ! I
The first physical exam given to Echazabal in 1996 by Dr. Philip Baily
showed that Echazabal suffered from serious liver damage.12 Dr. Baily
concluded that Echazabal's elevated liver enzymes precluded him from
working with toxic chemicals present at the Chevron refinery.13 Following
Dr. Baily's report, Chevron denied Echazabal's employment application,
but did not attempt to remove him from his position with Irwin Industries,
nor did it attempt to have him removed to a position where he would not
have been exposed to hepatotoxic chemicals.I4 Echazabal maintained his
position as a plant helper and fire-watcher with Irwin Industries at the El
Segundo plant until 1996.15
In late 1995, Echazabal made a second attempt to gain direct employ-
ment with Chevron. 16 Following the interview process, Chevron once again
extended an employment offer to Echazabal conditioned on his ability to
pass the company's physical exam. 17 Dr. Baily's successor, Dr. Kenneth
McGill, examined Echazabal, reviewed his previous medical records, and
conducted new blood tests. 18 After completing the physical exam and cor-
responding with Echazabal's personal physician, Dr. McGill concluded that
Echazabal's condition would be aggravated by continued exposure to toxins
at the El Segundo plant.19 Dr. McGill was concerned that repeated ex-
posure to small amounts of toxins or exposure from a catastrophic accident
9. Id. In its brief, Chevron stated that the official job description required that a prospective
employee be medically cleared to work in an environment in which the individual would be sub-
jected to the "physical/environmental demands" of the job. Id. In order to meet the job require-
ments, an individual had to "be able to work in an environment containing hydrocarbons, solvents,
and other chemicals." Id.
10. Respondent's Brief at 1, Echazabal (No. 00-1406).
11. Id.
12. Petitioner's Brief at 8, Echazabal (No. 00-1406).
13. Id.
14. Respondent's Brief at 2, Echazabal (No. 00-1406). Hepatotoxic chemicals are those that
pose a potential threat to an individual's liver or blood system. Id.
15. Id.
16. Petitioner's Brief at 8, Echazabal (No. 00-1406).
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id.
19. Id. Dr. McGill initiated contact with Echazabal's personal physician, Dr. Zelman Wein-
garten, through a telephone conversation explaining that Echazabal would be exposed to toxins by
virtue of his continued employment at Chevron. Id. Dr. Weingarten confirmed that repeated ex-
posure would not be advisable for Echazabal, although Echazabal's reply brief disputed that Dr.
Weingarten was properly informed of potential exposure levels that Echazabal would encounter at
the California plant. Id.; Respondent's Brief at 4 n.4, Echazabal (No. 00-1406).
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could ultimately result in Echazabal's death. 20 Additionally, Echazabal's
personal physician advised Chevron that continued exposure to hepatotoxic
chemicals would endanger his health.21
Chevron rescinded its offer of employment based on the results of
Echazabal's physical exam.22 Following Chevron's discovery, its officials
informed Irwin Industries that Echazabal needed to ,be reassigned to a posi-
tion that would not expose him to hepatotoxic refinery chemicals, or needed
to remove Echazabal from the El Segundo plant altogether.23 In response to
Chevron's request, Irwin Industries laid off Echazabal in early 1996.24
According to § 102 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),25 an
employer may not utilize screening practices that tend to disqualify persons
with disabilities. 26 In this case, Echazabal claimed that the physical exami-
nation requirement tended to screen out qualified individuals with disabili-
ties because of certain medical issues that were not necessarily related to
their ability to perform the essential functions of the position. 27 Echaza-
bal's claim was that he could perform the essential functions of his employ-
ment despite his medical condition, and several doctors agreed with him.28
Echazabal filed suit in California state court, claiming that Chevron
discriminated against him because of his disability.29 The state district
court granted Chevron's petition to remove the case to federal court because
20. Petitioner's Brief at 10, Echazabal (No. 00-1406).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 10-11.
23. Id. at 11. Irwin consulted Dr. Charles Tang, who concluded that if Echazabal would be
"exposed to hepatotoxins, he should not be" at the plant. Id.
24. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
26. Id. § 12112(a).
27. Brief for Respondent at 11, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002)
(No. 00-1406).
28. Id. at 6-7. Echazabal's brief revealed that two independent expert physicians were con-
sulted regarding the true nature of his liver condition. Id. The physicians, Dr. Marion Fedoruk
and Dr. Gary Gitnick, concluded that Echazabal's liver functioned properly and that his liver con-
dition was not in a state that would put him at greater risk for health problems, despite having
hepatitis C. Id. at 7. Chevron claimed that the contradicting physicians' opinions were introduced
by the plaintiff too late into the case for the court to appropriately consider them. Brief for
Petitioner at 40-42, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (No. 00-1406).
Additionally, the trial court indicated that if Chevron did not have access to the contradicting
expert opinions introduced by Echazabal prior to its employment decision regarding his hepatitis,
then it made a reasonable decision regarding his employment. Id. at 12 n.6.
29. Petitioner's Brief at 11, Echazabal (No. 00-1406). Echazabal initially filed in California
state court alleging that Chevron's withdrawal of its employment offer violated the ADA, the Re-
habilitation Act, and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. Echazabal also claimed
that Chevron intentionally interfered with a contractual relationship for employment between
Echazabal and Irwin Industries. Id.
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crucial allegations in the case were based on federal employment law. 30
The federal district court granted Chevron's request for summary judgment
and stayed Echazabal's claims against Irwin Industries. 31 The court based
its decision on Echazabal's failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Chevron acted reasonably by relying on medical advice
available to it at the time of Echazabal's physical examination.32
Echazabal appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 33 Although
the issue was not previously presented to the court during the course of the
litigation, the Ninth Circuit requested briefs from each party on whether the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation allowing
an affirmative "threat-to-self" defense exceeded the scope of permissible
rulemaking under the plain language of the ADA.34 Upon submission of
the briefs, the Ninth Circuit majority ruled that such a regulation exceeded
the EEOC's rulemaking authority based on the plain language of the
ADA.35
The ADA allows employers to adopt regulations that prevent disabled
employees from posing a threat to the health and safety of their fellow
workers; however, the Act does not specify whether an employee can be
prohibited from posing a threat to himself.36 Relying on the plain language
of the ADA, the Ninth Circuit held that the Act specified that only threats to
other individuals in the workplace were included within the scope of the
ADA defenses. 37 In addition, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the ADA
30. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2047 (2002).
31. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000). Echazabal also
filed various state and federal claims against Irwin Industries. Id. The federal district court
granted all three of Chevron's summary judgment motions, but denied Irwin Industry's summary
judgment motion. Id.
32. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2047-48.
33. Id. at 2047.
34. Id. The Ninth Circuit asked the parties and the EEOC, which was serving as amicus
curie, to discuss the threat-to-self defense at oral arguments. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1066 n.3.
The parties submitted briefs, however, the EEOC opted not to submit a brief regarding whether it
had overstepped its rulemaking authority in promulgating the additional defense. Id.
35. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2048.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (2000).
37. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1066-67 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113). The relevant language
provides:
(a) In general
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an
alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a
disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and





defined the term "direct threat" to mean "a significant risk to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommo-
dation." 38 The court emphasized that the ADA consistently did not include
threats to oneself in the listed defenses.
39
Applying the maxim expressio unius est exlusio,40 also called the
expression-exclusion doctrine, the majority concluded that Congress ex-
plicitly intended to leave out threat-to-self as an available defense for
employers under the ADA.41 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that
allowing employers to assert the threat-to-self defense would contradict
traditional congressional policies against paternalism in the workplace.
42
Following the Ninth Circuit's refusal to infer the threat-to-self defense
from the plain language of the ADA, Chevron petitioned for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.43 The Supreme Court held that the ADA per-
mits an employer to assert the EEOC affirmative defense that an employer
may lawfully screen out an employee who poses a direct threat to himself or
others.44
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The ADA protects persons with disabilities from unlawful discrimina-
tion in the workplace. 45 The need for legislation addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities was not recognized until the turn of the
last century, with the implementation of legislation to facilitate the re-entry
of wounded veterans into the workplace. 46 Disability discrimination legis-
The term "qualification standards" may include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace.
42 U.S.C. § 12113.
38. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1067 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3)).
39. Id.
40. This maxim means that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999). For example, the rule that "'each citizen is
entitled to vote' implies that noncitizens are not entitled to vote." Id.
41. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1067. The Ninth Circuit did not provide analysis on why this
maxim specifically applied, but simply stated that Congress intended to exclude the threat-to-self
defense. Id. The Supreme Court stated that Congress did not intend to exclude the threat-to-self
defense. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2053 (2002).
42. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1068.
43. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2048.
44. Id.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2000).
46. See Background to Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2076, 2082-90 (explaining the history of disability legislation in the United States since World
War 1).
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lation has continued to develop into its present-day form, which covers all
individuals. 47
A. THE SMITH-FESS ACT
In the aftermath of World War I, many American servicemen returned
to the population with disabling injuries.4 8 In an attempt to facilitate their
reintroduction into the working population, Congress passed the Smith-Fess
Act in 1920.49 It provided training, counseling, and job placement for indi-
viduals who suffered from disabling conditions. 50 The Smith-Fess Act was
one of the first major legislative actions to recognize the plight of disabled
workers and take affirmative steps to integrate individuals with disabilities
into the workforce. 51
Following World War II, Congress expanded the Smith-Fess Act to
include mentally ill and mentally retarded individuals.52 The expanded Act
introduced legislation that attempted to lessen the impact of individuals'
disabilities through medical intervention and rehabilitative training.53 Con-
gress broadened the scope of the Act to include physical therapy services
and restorative measures, such as outfitting disabled veterans with pros-
thetics. 54 The emphasis shifted from retraining individuals with disabilities
to limiting the disabilities themselves and the impact they had on the indi-
viduals' abilities to function successfully in the workplace. 55 In 1954,
Congress amended the Smith-Fess Act to provide research money for state
facilities. 56 Congress also extended benefits to additional disability groups
and community organizations. 57
47. See id.
48. Id. at 2082.
49. See id. (citing Smith-Fess Act, Pub. L. No. 66-236 (1920)).
50. Id. Although the Smith-Fess Act did not specifically focus on the inclusion of veterans,
veterans who fell under the definition of "physically handicapped" would have been covered by
the Act. See id. The Smith-Fess Act used the term "handicapped" to describe individuals with
disabilities. Id. ADA legislation later used the term "disabled" instead of "handicapped." 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
51. Background to Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2083.
52. Id.
53. Scott E. Schaffer, Comment, Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.: Conquering the Final
Frontier of Paternalistic Employment Practices, 33 CONN. L. REv. 1441, 1444 (2001).
54. Jennifer Lav, Note, Conceptualizations of Disability and the Constitutionality of Remedi-
al Schemes Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 197, 211
n.58 (2002) (citing the Smith-Fess Act).
55. Schaffer, supra note 53, at 1444.





Maintaining its focus on rehabilitation, Congress returned to the Smith-
Fess Act in the 1960s. 58 New legislation added amendments that expanded
the Act to include programs to assist disabled individuals in their pursuit of
viable employment opportunities. 59 In 1965, Congress took a major step
forward and extended disability benefits to the general population. 60 In ad-
dition to extending disability benefits, Congress increased funding in order
to encourage matching fund programs for states.61 Other amendments
added in 1965 included: authorizing Social Security funds to promote
rehabilitation services, improving rehabilitation centers, and funding the
construction of new facilities.62 The same legislation allocated Social
Security funds for additional aid to disability groups and severely
handicapped individuals.63
B. THE REHABILITATION ACT
In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act,64 which laid the foun-
dation for the ADA. The Rehabilitation Act prohibited discrimination by
federal agencies and contractors, and required them to engage in affirmative
action to employ qualified persons with disabilities.65 The Act essentially
prohibited any federal agency from discriminating against persons with
disabilities, either in an employment capacity or in any federal program.66
The Rehabilitation Act was significant to the implementation of the
ADA because the ADA adopted much of its language and ideas. 67 The
Rehabilitation Act was also the first time that the federal government
offered affirmative action programs that obligated federal employers and
contractors to employ disabled individuals. 68
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2083-84.




64. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-7961(2000)).
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (requiring any party contracting with the federal government for
an amount over $10,000 to "take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment
qualified individuals with disabilities").
66. See generally id. §§ 701-7961.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000) (stating that the ADA should be construed according to
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act).
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (stating the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act). Section 501(b) of the
Rehabilitation Act states that federal agencies shall implement "an affirmative action program
plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals." Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 501(b), 87 Stat. at 391.
2003]
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The Rehabilitation Act provided an important foundation for future
disability legislation. 69 In particular, two of the sections of the Rehabili-
tation Act were significant to the development of the ADA and, eventually,
the Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. EchazabalPO decision.7' First, the Rehabilitation
Act defined a handicapped individual as "any person who (i) has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such per-
son's major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment." 72 The ADA later adopted this
language to determine whether an individual qualifies for its protection. 73
Second, the Rehabilitation Act included language that laid the foundation
for the threat-to-self defense. 74 The threat-to-self defense was not con-
sidered during passage of the Rehabilitation Act, but it became significant
following its passage. 75
C. SCHOOL BOARD OF NASSAU COUNTY V. ARLINE
Fourteen years following the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, one
of the most important cases in the development of disability legislation,
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,76 appeared before the Supreme
Court.77 In Arline, the Supreme Court held that an individual afflicted with
a contagious disease was a handicapped individual and fell under the
protection of the Rehabilitation Act. 7
8
Gene Arline was an elementary school teacher in Nassau County,
Florida, from 1966 until her discharge in 1979.79 Because she was diag-
69. Lav, supra note 54, at 211 n.58.
70. 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
71. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2051.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(D). The text reads as follows:
For the purpose of sections [793 and 794 of this title], as such sections relate to
employment, such term does not include an individual who has a currently contagious
disease or infection and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute
a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the
currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of the job.
Id.
75. See 136 CONG. REC. S9684 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (discussing whether the threat-to-
self defense should be included in the ADA).
76. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
77. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline (Arline III), 480 U.S. 273, 287-89 (1987)
(finding that courts should conduct a medical inquiry in order to determine if a person with a
communicable disease poses a significant threat to the health and safety of other individuals in the
workplace).
78. Id. at 281.
79. Id. at 276.
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nosed with tuberculosis, Arline was dismissed from her position as a teach-
er. 80 She filed a suit in federal court alleging that the school's action vio-
lated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.8' The school answered her complaint
by alleging that she was not a qualified individual under the Rehabilitation
Act because contagious diseases were not considered disabilities.82 The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "persons with contagious dis-
eases are within the coverage of section 504."83 Additionally, the court
found that Arline's tuberculosis condition fell "neatly within the statutory
and regulatory framework" of the Rehabilitation Act.84 The Supreme Court
affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, but concluded that although Arline
was considered handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act, the school board
was justified in its decision to terminate her employment because her
disability posed a significant risk to the health and safety of others.85
In addition to aiding in the development of the Rehabilitation Act,
Congress later used the language from Arline to develop safety considera-
tions in the ADA.86 Following Arline, Congress amended the Rehabilita-
tion Act to exclude current carriers of contagious diseases or infections who
posed a direct threat to the health or safety of others from being considered
"qualified individual[s] with a disability."87
Some members of Congress were unhappy with the Arline decision and
attempted to overrule the Court's modification of the Rehabilitation Act by
adding amendments to the Civil Rights Restoration Act.88 However, legis-
80. Id. at 276-77. Arline was originally diagnosed with tuberculosis in 1957, however, the
disease had been in remission for twenty years. Id. at 276. In 1977 and 1978, Arline suffered
three relapses. Id. During the hearing at which Arline was discharged, the school board conceded
that she had done nothing wrong to warrant the discharge, but that her continued relapses of
tuberculosis were the reason for her termination. Id.
81. Id. at 275. Arline also claimed that the board denied her due process rights, however, the
district court and the court of appeals rejected this claim and Arline did not pursue the issue at the
Supreme Court. Arline v. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County (Arline I), 692 F. Supp. 1286, 1290-91
(N.D. I11. 1988).
82. Arline v. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County (Arline fl), 772 F.2d 759, 761 (11 th Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 764.
84. Id.
85. Arline 111, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987).
86. Compare id. at 287 (stating that "avoiding exposing others to significant health and safe-
ty risks" was a legitimate concern for employers), with 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000) (stating "an
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace").
87. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(D) (2000).
88. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32
(1987). Senator Humphrey proposed amendments to the Civil Rights Restoration Act during a
subcommittee hearing to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in Arline III. Chai R. Feld-
blum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why?
and What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 120 (2000) (citing S. Rep.
No. 64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 29-30). The
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lation that developed from this movement directly contradicted the initial
attempts to overturn Arline.89 Arline ultimately resulted in congressional
narrowing of the definition of "disability." 90
Arline was the first case in which the Supreme Court confronted
whether safety concerns preclude an otherwise qualified individual from
protection under the Rehabilitation Act.91 Language from Arline was later
incorporated into the ADA's list of affirmative defenses. 92 The defense dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in Arline is commonly known as the "direct
threat" defense.
93
Although Arline was decided in the context of the Rehabilitation Act,
the decision was significant to the passage of the ADA for two reasons.
94
First, the definition of "handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation
Act is identical to the ADA's definition of "individual with a disability."95
Thus, the Court's conclusion that Arline was a handicapped individual set
an important precedent for the future consideration of a disease as a dis-
ability. 96 However, shortly after Arline, Congress amended the Rehabilita-
tion Act's definition of "individual with a disability" to exclude carriers of
contagious diseases who pose a direct threat to the health and safety of
others.97 Second, the Court's holding that the direct threat issue be con-
sidered a part of the qualification analysis under § 504 impacted which
party would bear the burden of proof.
98
amendment would have excluded individuals with contagious diseases from being considered
handicapped under § 504. Id. at 121. However, the attempt to overturn Arline III was rejected by
a two to fourteen vote of the subcommittee. Id. at 120.
89. Feldblum, supra note 88, at 120-21 & n.155.
90. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32
(1987).
91. Arline MI, 480 U.S. 273, 275 (1987).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000).
93. See, e.g., Schaffer, supra note 53, at 1448.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (adopting language from Arline III to define "qualified
individual with a disability").
95. Compare id. (defining the term "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func-
tions of the employment position"), with Arline I11, 480 U.S. at 279 (quoting an early version of
29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A)) (defining "individual with a disability" as "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment").
96. See Schaffer, supra note 53, at 1449-50 (discussing codification of the "threat to others"
concept introduced in Arline III).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(D) (2000).
98. See Arline III, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987) (noting that the plaintiff had the burden of
proving that he did not pose a significant risk to the health and safety of other individuals in the
workplace).
2003] CASE COMMENT
In Arline, the Court held that individuals with contagious diseases were
considered handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act, thus providing them
the opportunity to prove they were qualified to perform the essential func-
tions of the position. 99 If no reasonable accommodation is possible without
an undue burden on the employer, after evaluating whether the individual
constitutes a public health risk, the individual will not be considered "other-
wise qualified."100 Specifically, the Court noted that a person who poses a
significant risk of communicating an infectious disease will not be "other-
wise qualified" for the position if a reasonable accommodation will not
eliminate the risk. 101
D. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Using the Rehabilitation Act as precedent and borrowing much of its
language, Congress passed the ADA in 1990 "to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities."102 The ADA essentially extended the sub-
stantive content of the Rehabilitation Act into the private employment
sector. 103
The ADA is comprised of three main titles that prohibit discrimination
in various forms, primarily in the employment sector.104 Title I of the ADA
prohibits employers with more than fifteen employees from discriminating
against qualified persons with disabilities.105 Title II prohibits public pro-
grams from excluding disabled persons.106 Title III prohibits private
99. Id. at 289; see also Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102
Stat. 28, 31 (1987) (stating that the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act would be defeated if Con-
gress permitted legislation that excluded carriers of contagious diseases from coverage under the
Act).
100. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. at 31.
101. See Arline Ill, 480 U.S. at 278 (quoting § 794 of the Rehabilitation Act, which states,
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section
[705(20)] of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance").
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
103. Id. § 12201(a). The statute states: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied
under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the regulations issued by federal agencies
pursuant to such title." Id.
104. Id. §§ 12101-12210. The findings and purpose section of the Act notes that discrimi-
nation is a pervasive problem in the areas of employment and public accommodation. Id. §
12101(a)(3).
105. Id. § 12111. The ADA defines an employer as a "person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person." Id. §
12111 (5)(A).
106. Id. §§ 12131-12165.
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entities from discriminating against disabled persons in public accommoda-
tion. 107 Title I applies to private employers, and they are bound to abide by
it.108 However, public employers, such as state and local governments, are
bound by both Title I and Title 11.109 The primary focus of this comment
deals with Title I because it governs employment law and individuals with
disabilities. 110
Adopting substantive law from the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA pro-
hibits an employer from using medical exams or inquiries to discriminate
against persons with disabilities.I In Armstrong v. Turner, 112 the court
noted:
A review of the legislative history shows that the section on medi-
cal examinations and inquires was included to parallel the same
requirements and regulations under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
and designed to prevent employers from using preemployment
information obtained from forms and interviews to exclude
applicants with disabilities, particularly persons with 'hidden'
disabilities. '13
The ADA prohibits an employer from using medical inquiries about a
potential employee in order to discriminate in the hiring process.1 4 How-
ever, § 102 allows employers to conduct medical inquiries if they can show
that the inquiries are job-related and consistent with business necessity."l 5
Accordingly, employers can extend offers of employment contingent upon
the prospective employee passing a standard physical exam.1
16
107. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
108. Id. §§ 12111-12117.
109. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 738 (5th ed. 2000).
110. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
111. Id. § 12112(d)(1).
112. 950 F. Supp. 162 (M.D. La. 1996).
113. Armstrong, 950 F. Supp. at 167; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1). In relevant part, §
12112(d)(l) states that "[t]he prohibition against discrimination as referred to in subsection (a)
shall include medical examinations and inquires." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(l).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B). The text of the statute states that "[a] covered entity may
make preemployment inquires into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions."
Id.
115. Id. § 12113(a). Section 12113(a) states:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this Act that an alleged appli-
cation of qualifications standards, test, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out or otherwise deny job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been
shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance




E. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
In an employment discrimination case initiated under the ADA, a
prima facie case is established when the plaintiff proves the following ele-
ments by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the plaintiff is disabled, as
defined by the ADA; (2) the plaintiff is qualified and able to perform the
essential functions of the job; and (3) the employer terminated employment
or failed to hire the plaintiff, in whole or in part, due to the plaintiff's
disability.17 After the plaintiff has established these three elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, the defendant may rebut the presumption of
discrimination by an assertion of one of the statutory affirmative
defenses.11'8
The ADA adopted the Rehabilitation Act's definition of disabled as "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual."ll9 Accordingly, the ADA also
adopted the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "major life activities," which
includes "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."120 In
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity, courts generally consider: (1) the nature and severity of the impair-
ment, (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) the
permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term
impact of or resulting from the impairment.121 The ADA does not define
what constitutes a per se disability. 122
In Bragdon v. Abbot, 123 the Supreme Court held that it was possible for
diseases, such as HIV, to qualify an individual as disabled.124 Accordingly,
chronic and debilitating conditions such as hepatitis qualify an individual as
"disabled" under the ADA.125 In Bragdon, the Court recognized that physi-
cal or mental impairments include disorders or conditions affecting an indi-
117. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447 (11th Cir. 1996)
(citing Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1994)).
118. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 n.3 (1993).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see also Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454
(7th Cir. 1995) (stating that an individual plaintiff carries the burden of proof that he is an
individual with a disability as defined by the Rehabilitation Act).
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2002).
121. Id. § 1630.2(/).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
123. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
124. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, which
held that a person infected with HIV that has not yet progressed to the symptomatic phase is an
individual with a disability under the ADA. Id. at 647.
125. See Quick v. Tripp, Scott, Conklin & Smith, P.A., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (ruling that a hepatitis C sufferer is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA).
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vidual's reproductive system.126 Noting that impairments to an individual's
reproductive system affect a major life activity, the Court reasoned that HIV
is a physical impairment "which substantially limits a major life activity, as
the ADA defines it."127 The ADA specifies that a "qualified individual" is
a person with a disability "who, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires."' 28
The ADA provides that written employment descriptions can be
evidence of the "essential functions of the job."129 Generally, the most
litigated issue in a case brought under the ADA is whether the individual
pursuing the action is a "qualified individual" as defined by § 12102.130
Ironically, in order for plaintiffs to meet the first element of the prima facie
requirements, they must demonstrate that they are disabled, but not so
disabled that they cannot perform the essential functions of the respective
job. 131
Section 12112 of the ADA prevents employers from discriminating
against disabled persons in the workplace. 132 Specifically, § 12112 pro-
hibits discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability."'33 Subsequent case law relating to the ADA has
dictated that medical conditions, such as hepatitis, are disabling conditions
protected by the ADA. 134
F. THE DEFENSES
In comparison to previous anti-discrimination statutes, the ADA broad-
ened available defenses to employers and other potential defendants.135
Employers accused of violating ADA provisions have a variety of defenses
126. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
127. Id. at 641.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
129. Id.; 29 CFR § 1630.2(n) (2002).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12102; see also Van Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th
Cir. 1995) (stating that intermittent impairments do not qualify an individual as disabled);
Schumacher v. Communications Contractors, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 971, 976 (N.D. I11. 2001)
(ruling that a torn aorta is not a qualified disability under the ADA because of the temporary
nature of the condition).
131. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir.. 1995) (holding that
when a disability prevents an individual from performing the essential functions of the position,
the employee is not otherwise qualified for the job).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Arline III, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987) (stating "[w]e hold that a person suffering
from [a] contagious disease. . . can be a handicapped person within the meaning of § 504").
135. ZIMMER Er AL., supra note 109, at 740.
[VOL. 79:147
CASE COMMENT
articulated in the plain language of the Act.136 Section 103 provides
affirmative defenses that a defendant employer may assert once the plaintiff
has established a prima facie case.137 After an employer asserts a viable
defense, the plaintiff has "the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that he can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
accommodation." 38
The first of these affirmative defenses is found in § 103 of the ADA,
which states that a qualification standard that tends to screen out qualified
individuals with a disability will be considered lawful when such a standard
can be "shown to be job-related for the position in question and... con-
sistent with business necessity."139 A qualification standard will be upheld
as lawful if the requirement protects the health and safety of other indi-
viduals in the workplace.140 If a disabled individual cannot perform job
functions safely with reasonable accommodation, then an employer can
lawfully screen out the disabled individual.141 In particular, the direct threat
defense states that "[t]he term 'qualification standard' may include a
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace." 42
Following the ADA's implementation, the EEOC expanded the above-
described affirmative defense to include direct threats to an employee's own
health.143 In accordance with Title I of the ADA, the EEOC promulgated
regulations providing that if an employee poses a direct threat to the health
and safety of himself and others, then an employer can lawfully screen out
that individual.44 The determination that an individual poses a "direct
threat" is generally conducted on a case-by-case basis, using the most cur-
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12113. The list of defenses includes appropriate screening processes, the
direct threat defense, religious exceptions, and infectious disease exceptions. Id.
137. Id.
138. Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir. 1995).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (2000).
141. Id. § 16 3 0.2 (p).
142. 42U.S.C. § 12113(b).
143. 29 C.F.R § 1630.15(b).
144. Id. Specifically, the text states "[d]irect [t]hreat means a significant risk of substantial
harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by
reasonable accommodation." Id. § 1630.2(r).
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rent medical technology.145 The extent of the medical inquiry is based on
four factors codified in the EEOC's regulation. 46
G. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that an employee bears the
burden of proving that he is not a threat to himself in the workplace, essen-
tially reading a threat-to-self defense into the ADA. 147 Similarly, dicta in a
1999 Seventh Circuit decision supported the threat-to-self defense.148 How-
ever, in 2000, the Ninth Circuit refused to read the threat-to-self defense
into the ADA, stating that courts should adhere to the plain language of the
listed defenses. 149
1. The Eleventh Circuit
In Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc.,150 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed a grant of summary judgment that the plaintiff employee failed to
demonstrate that he was not a direct threat to himself or others in the
workplace.' 5' Mark Moses, the plaintiff, had epilepsy and conceded that he
posed a direct threat to himself or his fellow workers because it was a
reasonable possibility that he could have seizures on the job.152 The
Eleventh Circuit's decision focused on Moses' failure to produce a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether American Nonwovens could have
reasonably accommodated his condition.153 However, the basis for the
ruling was that Moses posed a direct threat to himself, upholding the
EEOC's affirmative threat-to-self defense.154
Although Moses acknowledged the EEOC's threat-to-self defense, the
court's discussion regarding the defense was not lengthy.155 The Ninth
145. See id. § 1630.2(r) (stating that such an assessment "shall be based on a reasonable
medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best medical ob-
jective evidence"); see also Arline III, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987) (holding that continued employ-
ment of an individual who has a contagious disease should be based on an individual medical
inquiry).
146. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The four factors are: (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature
and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the
imminence of the potential harm. Id.
147. Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc. 97 F.3d 446, 448 (11 th Cir. 1996).
148. Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1999).
149. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1067 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000).
150. 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996).
151. Moses, 97 F.3d at 447-48.
152. Id. at 447.





Circuit's decision in Echazabal directly conflicted with Moses because it
questioned the legitimacy of the EEOC's threat-to-self defense.
56
2. The Seventh Circuit
Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 157 a decision by the Seventh
Circuit, was also implicated in Echazabal.158 In Koshinski, the plaintiff,
Koshinski, suffered from a degenerative disease in his wrist, which was
exacerbated by his physically demanding job as a foundry worker.159 His
employer "let him go" after receiving a physician's report that he would
have to change his occupation in order to get relief from the pain caused by
osteoarthritis. 160 Koshinski urged his employer to reinstate him, and when
the employer refused, he filed suit claiming that the refusal violated the
ADA. 161
Based on Koshinski's deposition testimony, the district court conclud-
ed that he was unable to perform the essential functions of the job without
subjecting himself to considerable physical and debilitating pain.
62
Although the Seventh Circuit's ultimate decision in the case was based on
Koshinski's inability to demonstrate that he was entitled to protection as a
qualified individual, dicta in the case supported the EEOC's threat-to-self
defense. 163
3. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.1
64
conflicted with Koshinski and Moses.165 Due to the tension raised among
the circuits following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Echazabal, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 166
156. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000).
157. 177 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1999).
158. Koshinski, 177 F.3d at 603; Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1072.
159. Koshinski, 177 F.3d at 603.
160. Id. at 602.
161. Id. at 601.
162. Id. at 603.
163. Id. The court cited the EEOC regulation setting forth the threat-to-self defense, but did
not evaluate its application because the court had already determined that Koshinski had not made
a prima facie case under the ADA because he could not perform his job functions. Id. at 603
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2002)).
164. 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000).
165. Compare Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1072 (stating that the direct threat defense "means
what it says: it permits employers to impose a requirement that their employees not pose a signifi-
cant risk to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace"), with Koshinski v. Decatur
Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1999) (speculating that EEOC regulations discussing
threat-to-self would be an available defense).
166. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2048 (2002).
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Although the Ninth Circuit's decision in Echazabal created a conflict
among the circuits, other decisions within the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
also treated the threat-to-self defense differently from each other.167 For
example, a district court located in the Seventh Circuit examined the threat-
to-self defense in Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc.168 and held that the threat-
to-self defense was not available to employers.169 In Kohnke, the Northern
District of Illinois ruled that the EEOC provision allowing the threat-to-self
defense was "untenable" with the plain language of the ADA.170 In
contrast, the Eleventh Circuit decided in Moses that the plaintiff asserting
discrimination carries the burden of proving that she is not a direct threat to
the health and safety of other employees, and that if such a threat exists, the
plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating that the employer could have
made a reasonable accommodation. 171
The Ninth Circuit explained the conflict it created by stating that the
ADA excluded threat-to-self as an affirmative defense for employers, and
therefore, Congress must have intended to exclude the threat-to-self defense
under the expression-exclusion doctrine previously used by the Supreme
Court to explain similar congressional exclusions.172 Consequently, the
EEOC overstepped its delegated authority when it implemented the regula-
tion specifying that when an employee poses a threat to himself, he is not
otherwise qualified for the position.173 Chevron argued that the regulation
was within the purview of congressional authorization and asserted that the
agency decision should be given deference because the ADA does not
unambiguously preclude the regulation. 74
4. The Ninth Circuit's Dissent
Judge Trott authored the dissent in the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Echazabal. 75 His dissent was based on two primary criticisms of the ma-
167. Compare Koshinski, 177 F.3d at 603 (evaluating the threat-to-self defense was within
the purview of the ADA), with Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1111 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (concluding that any "direct threat" jury instruction must refer to a direct threat to others,
not a direct threat to the plaintiff himself).
168. 932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
169. Kohnke, 932 F. Supp. at 1111-12.
170. Id.
171. Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11 th Cir. 1996).
172. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2000).
173. Id.
174. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2049 (2002) (citing United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)).
175. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1073 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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jority opinion.176 First, Judge Trott stated that Echazabal was not "other-
wise qualified" for the position at Chevron because employment in such a
capacity would seriously endanger his life. 177 Second, in relying on the
EEOC's interpretation of the ADA, Judge Trott explained that the EEOC's
relevant regulation provided that "the term 'qualification standard' may
include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace."178
Judge Trott agreed with the district court's finding that the EEOC regu-
lation essentially stated that an employer may implement a qualification
standard that prevents a disabled individual from performing the essential
functions of the job when the position may pose a direct threat to the health
or safety of the individual.179 Judge Trott wrote, "I do not understand how
we can claim [Echazabal] can perform the essential functions of the posi-
tion he seeks when precisely because of his disability, those functions may
kill him. To ignore this reality is bizarre."' 18 0
H. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
The history of the ADA began with a sincere congressional attempt to
integrate disabled veterans into the workplace after their service in World
War 1.181 Even though initial legislation was directed at limited popula-
tions, Congress eventually expanded disability legislation to encompass all
qualified individualsi8 2 Expansion of the legislation included matching
funds for state rehabilitation programs, as well as establishing affirmative
action programs for federal contractors.18 3 Recognizing the need for
continued modification of disability legislation, Congress continued
expanding disability legislation until it reached its current status in the form
of the ADA.'84 Until Echazabal, the Supreme Court had not judicially
modified the defenses listed in the ADA.185
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1074 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2002)).
179. Id. at 1073-74.
180. Id.
181. See Background to Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2076, 2082-90 (describing the history of disability legislation).
182. Id. at 2082-83.
183. Id. at 2083.
184. See id. at 2082-90 (narrating a complete background of disability legislation leading to
the Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
185. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2049 (2002).
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Echazabal started in a California state court, but was removed to a
federal district court at the request of Chevron.186 The district court ruled in
favor of Chevron on all of Echazabal's claims.187 Echazabal appealed to
the Ninth Circuit. 188 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the EEOC overstepped its
rulemaking authority by implementing the affirmative threat-to-self
defense. 189
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision, Chevron appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.1 90 The Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Ninth Circuit decision.191 The Court held that in an ADA employment dis-
crimination case, an employee who poses a threat to himself may be legally
discharged under EEOC regulations promulgated under the ADA, even
when the employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination.192
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court decided Echazabal unanimously, with Justice
Souter writing the Court's opiniol. 3 The basis for the Court's decision in
Echazabal was the inapplicability of the doctrine of expressio unius
exclusio alterius, or "expressing one item of an associated group or series
excludes another left unmentioned."194 Also called the expression-exclu-
sion rule, this doctrine generally states that if a provision expresses one
thing, it excludes other things not specified.195 The Court determined that
the Ninth Circuit was incorrect when it held that the expression-exclusion
doctrine applied in Echazabal.196
The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit's reliance on United States v.
Vonn 197 was inappropriate.198 In Vonn, the issue was the proper interpreta-
186. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000).
187. Id. at 1065 n.1. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron on
three other claims asserted by Echazabal, including a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a claim
under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, and a tortious interference claim asserting
that Chevron interfered with Echazabal's employment contract with Irwin Industries. Id. The
Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on the first two claims. Id.
In a separate memorandum, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment with respect to the intentional interference with contract claim. Id.
188. Id. at 1065.
189. Id. at 1069.
190. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2048.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2053.
193. Id. at 2047.
194. Id. at 2049.
195. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999).
196. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2049 (2002).
197. 535 U.S. 55 (2002).
198. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2049-50.
[VOL. 79:147
CASE COMMENT
tion of a rule of criminal procedure. 199 Ultimately, the Court held that if
Rule 11(h) implied that Rule 52(b) had no application to Rule 11 errors,
then the Court would be finding a partial repeal of Rule 52(b) by impli-
cation.200 The finding by the Court was based on the expression-exclusion
doctrine. 20' Although the Vonn Court evaluated the expression-exclusion
doctrine, it ultimately held that the doctrine was only meant to be a guide
and that its application should be limited.202
The Court then stated that employers could screen out potential em-
ployees or discontinue employment of current employees who pose a threat
to other individuals. 203 Regulations implemented by the EEOC, as a rule-
making body authorized by Congress, extrapolated the ADA's regulations
and stated that when an employee poses a threat to himself or others, the
employer has an affirmative defense.204 Unfortunately, the Court could not
turn to the Rehabilitation Act for guidance because nothing in the Act or in
its legislative history discussed the threat-to-self defense or other safety
issues as affirmative defenses available for employers. 205
The Court recognized that Echazabal's position was that the language
of the ADA allowed employers to screen out potential employees by "quali-
fication standards" that are "job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity." 206 Additionally, Echazabal originally conceded that if a reasonable
accommodation could not have been made, Chevron would have an
additional defense.207 The Court summarized Chevron's position by stating
that "[w]ithout more, those provisions would allow an employer to turn
away someone whose work would pose a serious risk to himself."208 The
EEOC's provision plainly states that if an employee poses a threat to him-
self or others, an employer has an affirmative defense against a charge of
199. Vonn, 535 U.S. at 99.
200. Id. at 103-04.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 102-04.
203. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2048-49; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b) (2000).
204. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2049.
205. Id.
206. Id. Echazabal did not claim that Chevron's practice of conducting medical examin-
ations violated the ADA. See generally Brief for Respondent, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,
122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (No. 00-1406) (arguing that the primary ADA violation occurred when
Chevron asserted that Echazabal was a threat to himself).
207. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2049.
208. Id.
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discrimination, whereas Echazabal asserted that the EEOC provision could
result in circumvention of the ADA's purpose.209
However, the Court held that the expression-exclusion doctrine did not
apply in Echazabal for three fundamental reasons, and therefore, the
EEOC's expansion of the ADA's affirmative defenses was reasonable and
within its delegated authority. 210 Citing a group of cases in which the
expression-exclusion doctrine did not apply, the Court stated that the
maxim did not apply to the ADA regulation in question. 211 First, the Court
stated that Congress's list of affirmative defenses only served as examples
of potential defenses.212 This was confirmed by the plain language of the
statute, which included the phrase "may include." 213 Additionally, the
Court pointed out that the listed affirmative defenses were "spacious defen-
sive categories." 214 Appropriate use of the expression-exclusion doctrine
requires that the statute itself invite application of the maxim.215 The Court
found that a listing of examples does not constitute an express intent by
Congress to exclude potential, non-listed affirmative defenses. 216
Relying on a case that originated in North Dakota, Federal Land Bank
of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co.,217 the Court argued that the defensive
categories were intended as examples and not as an inclusive list.218 The
Court further stated that expansive phrasing, such as the general language
used in the ADA, precluded application of the expression-exclusion rule. 219
The second reason cited by the Court for not applying the expression-
exclusion rule was Echazabal's failure to identify an analogous application
of the expression-exclusion rule.220 Essentially, the Court stated that al-
though Echazabal argued that Congress intentionally omitted the threat-to-
self defense, he failed to show an example of agency rulemaking that
indicated the omission was in fact intentional. 22'
209. See id. at 2053 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2002) (stating that if an employee is a
direct threat to himself or others, then an employer may lawfully discriminate against that
individual)).
210. Id. at 2049-50.
211. Id. (citing United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 825 (2001) and
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 683 (1991)).
212. Id. at 2050.
213. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
214. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2050 (2002).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 314 U.S. 95 (1941).






The congressional record was silent regarding whether failure to
include the threat-to-self defense was intentional. 222 Thus, applying the
expression-exclusion doctrine was inappropriate. 223 The expression-exclu-
sion doctrine requires that the excluded material be a part of a natural series,
or if the doctrine is applied, there must be a standard usage of the material
such that an exclusion of the material would be a deviation, indicating an
intentional omission.224 The Court concluded that Echazabal failed to
demonstrate that standard usage of the affirmative defenses excluded a
threat-to-self defense. 225 Consequently, Echazabal could not demonstrate
that Congress's omission of the threat-to-self defense was intentional. 22
6
The final reason provided by the Court for not applying the expression-
exclusion rule was that applying it in Echazabal would lead to a slippery
slope. 227 The Court reasoned that if employers were limited to the listed
defenses in the ADA, a contagious individual could sue an employer if the
employer refused to hire the individual on the basis that the contagious
disease would pose a threat to the general public. 228 For example, if an
individual was infected with a contagious disease such as typhoid, an em-
ployer could not refuse employment of the individual on the basis that the
individual posed a threat to fellow employees, as well as the general pub-
lic. 229 The Court reasoned, "If Typhoid Mary had come under the ADA,
222. Id. at 2050-52.
223. Id. There was evidence to contradict this statement in the congressional record. 136
CONG. REC. S9684 (daily ed. July 13, 1990). In his speech on the senate floor, Senator Edward
Kennedy gave this explanation:
The ADA provides that a valid qualification standard is that a person not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the work place - that is, to
other coworkers or customers. A specific decision was made to state clearly in the
statute that, as a defense, an employer could prove that an applicant or employee posed
a significant risk to the health of [sic] safety of others, which could not be eliminated
by reasonable accommodation. This is a restatement of the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County versus Arline. It is important,
however, that the ADA specifically refers to the health and safety of others. Under the
ADA, employers may not deny a person an employment opportunity based on
paternalistic concerns regarding the person's health. For example, an employer could
not use as an excuse for not hiring a person with HIV disease the claim that the
employer was simply "protecting the individual" from opportunistic diseases to which
the individual might be exposed. That is a concern that should rightfully be dealt with
by the individual, in consultation with his or her private physician.
Id. at S9697. It is not clear whether the Court overlooked this section of the legislative history, or
if it chose not to apply it because the discussion took place in the context of HIV, rather than in a
general context. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053 n.5.
224. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2050.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2051.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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would a meat packer have been defenseless if Mary had sued after being
turned away?" 2
30
In addition to the expression-exclusion doctrine, the Court stated that
public policy reasons dictated that the Court allow the regulation to sur-
vive.231 Utilizing the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA)232 as an
example, the Court concluded that Chevron was justified in refusing to hire
Echazabal because his presence could result in potential OSHA violations,
for which the company would ultimately be responsible. 233
The Court concluded that the expression-exclusion doctrine did not ap-
ply to the listed defenses in the ADA, and therefore, the affirmative defense
asserted by Chevron was permissible. 234 Accordingly, Echazabal was not
otherwise qualified for the position of plant helper in the refinery. 235
IV. IMPACT
During the 2002 Supreme Court session, the Court heard three employ-
ment discrimination cases and ruled in favor of the employer in each
case.236 The decision in Echazabal was no exception. 237 In addition to
strong public policy considerations, the Court voiced serious concerns that
limiting affirmative defenses could escalate into absurd situations where an
employer would be required to hire individuals who pose health and safety
concerns to the general public, as well as themselves and fellow em-
ployees. 238 Although the Supreme Court had never specifically addressed
the threat-to-self defense prior to its ruling in Echazabal, other circuits had
230. Id. Typhoid Mary is a fictional character reputed to be the original character of the
typhoid epidemic. What You Need to Know About, Typhoid Mary, available at, http://history
1900s.about.com/library/weekly/aaO62900ahtm (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
231. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2052 (2002).
232. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
233. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2052.
234. Id. at 2053.
235. Id.
236. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194-96 (2002) (ruling that
carpal tunnel syndrome is not considered a disability for ADA purposes because it does not pre-
vent or severely restrict the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to daily
life activities); US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 398 (2002) (ruling that when a plaintiff's
accommodation request for reassignment to another job conflicts with a disability-neutral policy,
such as an established seniority system, the accommodation request is unreasonable and the em-
ployer is not bound to accommodate the individual with a disability); Echazbal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053
(ruling that an employer may lawfully discriminate against an individual who poses a significant
risk to his own health or safety which cannot be reasonably accommodated); see also Barnes v.
Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097, 2103 (2002) (holding that municipalities are not subject to punitive
damages in discrimination suits).
237. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053.
238. Id. at 2051.
CASE COMMENT
addressed the issue and affirmed the EEOC's regulation. 239 Echazabal af-
firms those decisions and paves the way for future expansion of affirmative
defenses in ADA suits.240
A. NATIONAL IMPACT
The Court's arguably pro-employer stance may set a trend for future
ADA cases. 241 One of the definitive impacts of Echazabal includes further
guidance for employers as to what degree one must provide accommodation
for a future or current employee when the employee may pose a potential
threat to himself or others.242
One position against the ruling in Echazabal argues that the Court's
holding will bestow employers with the power to make it more difficult for
disabled workers to obtain and maintain employment. 243 However, the
Court countered this criticism by insisting that consideration of employees'
individual medical inquiries would limit any circumvention of the law. 244
Specifically, employers would have to base any adverse employment deci-
sion on a "reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current
medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence," 245
therefore limiting general discrimination or overprotective policies.246
In addition to expanding the affirmative defenses available under the
ADA, the decision in Echazabal deferred to agency decisions, such as those
by the EEOC.247 Although this area of the law is well settled, this case
affirmed the doctrine that when Congress is silent on an issue of legislative
interpretation, an agency's interpretation should be given deference. 248
Finally, the Court's expansive interpretation of the listed affirmative de-
239. See Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
an employee that poses a threat to his own health or safety is not otherwise qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job). But see Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110,
1111 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that the "direct threat" language in the ADA refers to other
individuals, not to the disabled individual).
240. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053.
241. William C. Smith, Drawing Boundaries, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2002, at 49, 49-50.
242. Id. at 52.
243. Id.
244. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053.
245. Id.
246. Supreme Court Upholds ADA's 'Threat to Self Defense, 12 DISABILITY L. REP. 2, 2
(2002).
247. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2049.
248. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)).
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fenses in the ADA sets a precedent that will allow future expansions of the
defenses when one is not specifically listed.249
B. APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA LAW
The ADA and EEOC regulations are federal law and significantly
affect North Dakota law. 250 Section 14-02.4-03 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on
bases similar to those articulated in the ADA.251 Consequently, an expan-
sion of affirmative defenses could reasonably be argued to apply to North
Dakota law.252
Employment law in North Dakota has not yet seen a case analogous to
Echazabal.253  However, EEOC regulations that apply federal law
potentially affect North Dakota employment law decisions, 254 and the North
Dakota EEOC is bound by federal law stemming from Echazabal.255
Echazabal has a second important impact on North Dakota law, which
includes the Court's decision not to apply the expression-exclusion doc-
249. Smith, supra note 241, at 52.
250. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-44.3-12(13) (2001) (directing the North Dakota Department
of Labor to abide by federal employment law and agency decisions).
251. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (1997). The text states:
It is a'discriminatory practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire a person; to
discharge an employee; or to accord adverse or unequal treatment to a person or em-
ployee with respect to application, hiring, training, apprenticeship, tenure, promotion,
upgrading, compensation, layoff, or a term, privilege, or condition of employment,
because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental disability,
status with respect to marriage or public assistance, or participation in lawful activity
off the employer's premises during nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict
with the essential business-related interests of the employer. It is a discriminatory
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to make reasonable accommodations for an
otherwise qualified person with a physical or mental disability or because of that per-
son's religion. This chapter does not prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee
who has attained sixty-five years of age, but not seventy years of age, and who, for the
two-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive
or high policy making position, if the employee is entitled to an immediate nonfor-
feiture annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred
compensation plan, or any combination of those plans, of the employer of the
employee, which equal, in the aggregate, at least forty-four thousand dollars.
Id.
252. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053.
253. See Koehler v. County of Grand Forks, 2003 N.D. 44, 5 15 (finding that the plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case); Anderson v. Meyer Broad. Co., 2001 N.D. 125, T 19, 630
N.W.2d 46, 52 (stating that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she was a member of a
protected class).
254. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-44.3-12(13); see also Koehler, 2003 N.D. 44, 5 12 (stating that
the court looks to federal interpretations for guidance on corresponding anti-discrimination
statutes).
255. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-44.3-12(13).
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trine. 256 In North Dakota, the expression-exclusion doctrine applies to
cases involving both statutory construction and contract law.257
The North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized that the expression-
exclusion doctrine is limited in its application to statutory interpretation. 258
In Park View Manor, Inc. v. Housing Authority of Stutsman County,259 the
North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the expression-exclusion doctrine
and applied it to contract construction. 260 Applying the doctrine to an im-
plied term in the contract, the court stated that when definitions contain
"words of inclusion and words of exclusion coupled with words of limita-
tion," then the maxim expressio unius applies to the conditions.261 Accord-
ingly, application of the expression-exclusion rule demonstrates that the
drafters intended to reflect a closed class of items in a list and intended to
exclude all items not listed.262 If the North Dakota Supreme Court is per-
suaded to adopt the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
expression-exclusion doctrine, it would narrow the state's traditional
interpretation of the doctrine, which has been readily applied to appropriate
statutes and contracts.263
V. CONCLUSION
In Echazabal, the United States Supreme Court held that an EEOC
regulation offering employers the threat-to-self defense is a valid extension
of employers' ADA defenses. 264 The Court also recognized the limitations
of the expression-exclusion doctrine and warned that its application should
be limited to cases in which the language of a statute invites its
application. 265
Erin M. Conroy
256. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2049.
257. Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, T 20, 628 N.W.2d
707, 714; Park View Manor, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of Stutsman County, 300 N.W.2d 218, 225 (N.D.
1980) (citing Goebel v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Racine, 266 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Wis.
1978)).
258. See Dist. One Republican Comm. v. Dist. One Democrat Comm., 466 N.W.2d 820, 832
(N.D. 1991) (stating that rules such as expressio unius should not be applied to lead to absurd
results).
259. 300 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1980).
260. Park View Manor, 300 N.W.2d at 225-26.
261. Id. at 226.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 225.
264. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2052-53 (2002).
265. Id. at 2049-50.
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